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A THIRD PARTY DEFENDANT'S CLAIM AGAINST PLAINTIFF UPHELD
DESPITE ABSENCE OF INDEPENDENT JURISDICTIONAL GROUNDS
Revere Copper & Brass, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. 426 F.2d 709
(5th Cir. 1970)
Revere brought a diversity action against Aetna on a performance
bond executed by the latter on behalf of the George A. Fuller Co.
Aetna impleaded Fuller alleging an indemnity agreement. Fuller, as
third-party defendant, filed a claim against Revere pursuant to Rule
14(a)' whereupon Revere moved to dismiss for lack of diversity between
itself and Fuller. The trial court overruled the motion. On interlocutory
appeal, held: A third-party defendant's assertion of a claim against a
plaintiff under Rule 14(a) arising out of the transaction or occurrence
that is the subject matter of the original claim does not require
independent grounds of federal jurisdiction.2
Although conflicting district court decisions exist on the issue
presented in Revere, it is one of first impression at the court of appeals
level. As noted in Revere, prior decisions which have required an
independent basis of jurisdiction under facts similar to those presented
to the fifth circuit have supported their holdings on two grounds. First,
employing a theory of jurisdictional mutuality developed by Professor
Moore,3 it is argued that, because independent grounds of jurisdiction
are required when a plaintiff asserts a claim against a third-party
defendant, that same requirement should apply to a third-party
defendant who asserts a claim against the plaintiff.4 Second, two
district courts construed Rule 825 to prohibit jurisdiction for any non-
1. FED. R. Civ. P. 14(a) provides in part: "The third-party defendant may also assert any claim
against the plaintiff arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the
plaintiff's claim against the third-party plaintiff."
2 Revere Copper & Brass, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 426 F.2d 709 (5th Cir. 1970). The
Fifth Circuit in Revere uses the term "counterclaim" to designate Fuller's third-party complaint
against Revere. This designation seems incorrect and confusing. First, Rule 14(a), quoted supra.
note I, uses the term "claim" to designate such a complaint. Second, Rule 14(a) provides that the
third-party shall assert his counterclaims "as provided in Rule 13." Third, Fuller's third-party
complaint is not within the meaning of the term "counterclaim" because Revere is technically
not an "opposing party" as required in Rule 13 until it asserts a claim against Fuller. Accord,
Morris, Wheeler & Co. v. Rust Engineering, 4 F.R.D. 307 (D. Del. 1945). For the above reasons, the
term "claim" is used infra to designate Fuller's third-party complaint against Revere.
3 3 J MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE I 14.27 (2d ed. 1948).
4. Shverha v. Maryland Cas. Co., 110 F. Supp. 173, 174 (E.D. Pa. 1953) (court adopted Moore's
theory); James King & Son, Inc. v. Indemnity Ins. Co., 178 F. Supp. 146, 148 (S.D. N.Y. 1959)
(FED R Civ P. 82 was also considered, with Rule 14. Court relied upon Shverha). See also Note,
Rule 14: Federal Third-Party Practice, 58 COLUM. L. REv. 532, 542-43 (1958).
5. See note 32 infra.
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federal claim by a third-party defendant against the plaintiff under
Rule 14(a) if those parties lack diversity. 6 On the other hand, those
district court decisions which foreshadow the holding in Revere rely
upon the application of ancillary jurisdiction developed in analogous
situations arising under Rules 13(a) and 24(c).7
The fifth circuit in Revere bases its decision on the concept of
ancillary jurisdiction." Even though notoriously illusive,' that concept
is regarded as a necessity if the object of the Federal Rules to
adjudicate all claims arising from a single litigous situation 0 is to be
achieved without expanding the jurisdiction of the district courts." The
doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction is routinely applied under Rule 13(a)
to allow compulsory counterclaims without independent grounds of
jurisdiction.' 2 Because of the similarity between compulsory
counterclaims under Rule 13(a) and claims by a third-party defendant
under Rule 14(a), the fifth circuit in Revere and two district courts 3
have reasoned that an extension of ancillary jurisdiction to claims
under 14(a) is logical. Both compulsory counterclaims under Rule
6. James King & Son, Inc. v. Indemnity Ins. Co., 178 F. Supp. 146, 148 (S.D. N.Y. 1959);
Morris, Wheeler & Co. v. Rust Engineering Co., 4 F.R.D. 307 (D. Del. 1945) (dictum).
7. Union Bank & Trust Co. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 38 F.R.D. 486 (D. Neb. 1965);
Heintz & Co. v. Provident Tradesmens Bank & Trust Co., 30 F.R.D. 171 (E.D. Pa. 1962) [noted in
62 COLUM. L. REV. 1513 (1962); 8 UTAH L. REV. 145 (1962)]. See also Bernstein v. N.V.
Nederlandische-Americaansche Stoomvaart-Maatschappig, 9 F.R.D. 557 (S.D. N.Y. 1949); Note,
Federal Courts-Third Party Practice, 18 TExAs L. REV. 198 (1940).
8. The rationale of the doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction is that once a federal court acquires
jurisdiction of an action it may entertain other claims not independently capable of conferring
jurisdiction "as an incident to disposition of a matter properly before it." C. WRIGHT, LAW OF
FEDERAL COURTS § 9 (1970).
9. C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS §§ 9, 19 (1970); Fraser, Ancillary Jurisdiction and the
Joinder of Claims in the Federal Courts, 33 F.R.D. 27, 45 (1964); Note, Federal Practice:
Jurisdiction of Third-Party Claims, I I OKLA. L. REV. 326, 329 (1958). Compare Fulton Nat'l Bank
of Atlanta v. Hozier, 267 U.S. 276 (1925); Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 356
(1921) with Dewey v. West Fairmont Gas Coal Co., 123 U.S. 329 (1887).
10. Clark & Moore, A New Federal Civil Procedure: I. Pleadings and Parties, 44 YALE L.J.
1291, 1322 (1932); Lesnik v. Public Industrials Corp., 144 F.2d 968, 973 (2d Cir. 1944); United
States v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 46 F. Supp. 30,34 (D. Conn. 1942); Note, The Ancillary Concept and
the Federal Rules, 64 HARV. L. REv. 968 (1951).
11. Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806), holds that there must be diversity
between each plaintiff and each defendant. Hurn v. Oursler, 289 U.S. 238 (1933) stated that federal
jurisdiction may not be expanded by a rule of court. FED. R. Civ. P. 82 provides that the federal
rules shall not be construed to extend the jurisdiction of district courts.
12. 3 J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 13.15 (2d ed. 1948); IA W. BARRON & A. HOLTZOFF,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 392 (Wright ed. 1960) and cases cited at n. 25 therein.
13. Union Bank & Trust Co. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 38 F.R.D. 486 (D. Neb. 1965);
Heintz & Co. v. Provident Tradesmens Bank & Trust Co., 30 F.R.D. 171 (E.D. Pa. 1962).
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13(a)" and third-party defendant claims against the plaintiff under
Rule 14(a) must arise out of the transaction or occurrence that is the
subject of the original claim. The Supreme Court held in Moore v. New
York Cotton Exchange15 that a compulsory counterclaim under old
Equity Rule 30 was ancillary because it arose out of the transaction
which was the subject of the original claim-defining transaction as
comprehending "a series of many occurrences, depending not so much
upon the immediateness of their connection as upon their logical
relationship."'" The third circuit has held 7 that the issue of ancillary
jurisdiction and the issue of whether a counterclaim is compulsory are
both answered by the "logical relation" test established in Moore. The
only distinction between a compulsory counterclaim and a third-party
claim against the plaintiff is that the former "must" be pleaded and
the latter "may" be pleaded. This is a distinction without a difference,
for the claim does not become ancillary because it must be pleaded but
because of its relation to the transaction upon which the original claim
is based.'" The Revere court found the analogy between the Rule 14(a)
claim and the Rule 13(a) compulsory counterclaim "persuasive"1 9 in
determining whether Rule 14(a) claims by the third-party defendant are
ancillary. In support of this position it should be pointed out that, since
the 1946 Amendment to Rule 14(a)20 was intended to give the third-
party defendant the procedural right to assert a claim against the
plaintiff previously unassertable under 13(a),21 those claims under Rule
14(a) as amended, arguably, should be governed by the same principles
of federal jurisdiction applicable under Rule 13(a). Based on the
concept of ancillary jurisdiction and the similarities. between Rules
13(a) and 14(a), the Revere position seems justified.
14 FED. R. CIV. P. 13(a) provides in part:
A pleading shall state as a counterclaim any claim which at the time of serving the pleading
the pleader has against an opposing party, if it arises out of the transaction or occurrence
that is the subject matter of the opposing party's claim and does not require for its
adjudication the presence of third parties of whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction
15 270 U.S. 593 (1962).
16 Id. at 610.
17 Great Lakes Rubber Corp. v. Herbert Cooper Co., 286 F.2d 631,633 (3d Cir. 1961).
18. Heintz & Co. v. Provident Tradesmens Bank & Trust Co., 30 F.R.D. 171, 174 (E.D. Pa.
1962).
19. Revere Copper & Brass, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 426 F.2d 709 (5th Cir. 1970).
20. FED. R. Civ. P. 14(a) was amended in 1946 to include the language quoted in note 1, supra.
Bernstein v. N.V. Nederlandische-Amerikaansche Stoomvaart-Maatschappig, 9 F.R.D. 557, 558
(S.D N.Y. 1949).
21. Morris, Wheeler & Co. v. Rust Engineering, 4 F.R.D. 307 (P. Del. 1945).
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Persuaded by the analogy to Rule 13(a), the fifth circuit removed
"'any substantial doubt"' it had concerning the jurisdictional problem
by reasoning that, since Fuller could have intervened under Rule 24(a) 2
and have counterclaimed without independent grounds of jurisdiction,
it would be "anomalous ' 24 to require independent grounds for the
claim under Rule 14(a) against the plaintiff when Fuller was impleaded.
In a factual situation indistinguishable from Revere, the second
circuit,2s in a case heavily relied upon in Revere, allowed intervention
as of right without diversity and, on the basis of Moore, allowed a
counterclaim against the plaintiff without diversity. The counterclaim
was based on the alleged breach of the same contract originally sued
on and was allowed, not because it was filed subsequent to a claim by
intervention of right, but because it met the "logical relationship" test
established in Moore.26 The argument that Fuller could have intervened
under Rule 24(a) and counterclaimed against Revere without
independent jurisdictional grounds is of itself unpersuasive when it is
realized that the requirements of Rule 13(a), not 24(a), would cause the
claim to be ancillary. Moreover, the analogy to Rule 24(a) is
speculative because apparently no decisions exist on the question of
ancillary jurisdiction under Rule 24(a)2 since the scope of that rule was
broadened in 1966, making it difficult to determine what result will be
reached by the courts.2Y
Rule 14(a) also provides that a plaintiff may take the initiative and
assert a claim against a third-party defendant arising out of the
transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the original
claim.2 " As indicated, Professor Moore argued that, because
22. Revere Copper & Brass, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 426 F.2d 709 (5th Cir. 1970).
23. FED. R. Civ. P. 24(a) provides:
(a) Intervention of Right, upon timely application anyone shall be permitted to intervene in
an action: (1) when a statute of the United States confers an unconditional right to intervene;
or (2) when the applicant claims an interest relating to the property or transaction which is
the subject of the action and he is so situated that the disposition of the act may as a practical
matter impair or impede his ability to protect that interest, unless the applicant's interest is
adequately represented by existing parties.
24. 426 F.2d at 716.
25. United States ex rel. Foster Wheeler Corp. v. American Sur. Co., 142 F.2d 726 (2d Cir.
1944).
26. Id. at 728.
27. 2 W. BARRON & A. HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 593 (Wright ed.
cum. supp. 1969); C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 75 (1970).
28. C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 75 (1970).
29. FED. R. Civ. P. 14(a) provides in part:
The plaintiff may assert any claim against the third-party defendant arising out of the
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1970/iss4/6
THIRD PARTY DEFENDANT
independent grounds of jurisdiction are required when a plaintiff asserts
a claim against a third-party defendant, the same requirement should
apply when a third-party defendant asserts a claim against the
plaintiff.3 This argument is only as strong as the initial proposition
that the plaintiff's claim requires independent grounds of jurisdiction.
Although that proposition is generally accepted, 3 ' authority to the
contrary32 weakens Professor Moore's argument. Moore correctly
points out that the arguments based on the purpose of Rule 14 to settle
related matters in the same action and the arguments based on the
discretionary power of judges to prevent actual collusion can be made
to support a no-independent-grounds requirement for claims between
the plaintiff and third-party defendant initiated by either one under
Rule 14(a).33 However, this fails to support his argument by further
weakening his initial proposition and making the argument for
jurisdictional mutuality less than compelling.
While the decision in Revere will give a larger number of nondiverse
claims access to a federal forum, the problem remains whether this
application of ancillary jurisdiction is proper under either Rule 8 23 or
the diversity requirements of the Constitution.3 5 The fifth circuit
correctly notes that ancillary jurisdiction was well established before
the Federal Rules became effective and does not extend federal diversity
jurisdiction.x It is argued in Revere that the decision merely provides
an opportunity for properly involving the doctrine in an additional
situation. The Federal Rules use the term "claim"3 7 to denote a score
of operative facts giving rise to legal rights. 38 Since Rule 14(a) requires
the third-party claim against the plaintiff to arise out of the same
transaction and occurrence as the original claim, no new "claim" is
transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the plaintiff's claim against the third-
party plaintiff, and the third-party defendant thereupon shall assert his defenses as provided
in Rule 12 and his counterclaims and cross-claims as provided in Rule 13.
30. 3 J. MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE, 14.27 (2d ed. 1948).
3 1. IA W. BARRON & A. HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 424 (Wright ed.
cum. supp. 1969) and cases cited at n.31a therein.
32. Id.
33. 3 J. MooRE. FEDERAL PRACTICE IF 14.27 [2] (2d ed. 1968).
34. FED. R. Civ. P. 82 provides in part:
These rules shall not be construed to extend or limit the jurisdiction of the United States
district courts or the venue of action therein.
35. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, clause 2; 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331-32 (1958).
36. See Comment, 62 COLUM. L. REV. 1513 (1962) cases and materials cited at n. 2 therein.
37. FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a).
38. Dery v. Wyer, 265 F.2d 804, 807 (2d Cir. 1959); Original Ballet Russe v. Ballet Theatre,
133 F.2d 187, 189 (2d Cir. 1943).
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introduced. Obviously, no new parties are introduced to the action, for
the third-party was previously drawn into the action by impleader.
The decision in Revere leads to the resolution of all claims in one
action. Substantial authority, however, suggests that the diversity
jurisdiction of federal courts should be restricted as a general policy. 9
Since the question of the restriction of diversity jurisdiction as a policy
remains unresolved, the decision in Revere seems clearly warranted in
light of the analogous application of the doctrine of ancillary
jurisdiction under Rule 13(a), the less persuasive arguments to the
contrary based on Rule 82 and the theory of jurisdictional mutuality.
39. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND
FEDERAL COURTS 1 (1969).
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